Reviews

Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America by Qiao Liang

zare_i's review against another edition

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4.0

If this book was a breakthrough for Western militaries in 1990's and a wake up call at current time then I can say only it is great disappointment especially concerning the modern Western military thought.

First, concept of total war (or what is called unrestricted warfare here) is as old as Roman campaigns in Dalmatia and today's Spain. Whoever read anything about the Peninsular campaign and Napoleon's campaign in Russia or WW2 Poland military actions or SOE actions and sabotages of industry and means of production, Germany's constant play of Ireland against UK from WW1 till the end of WW2, IRA and ETA, Middle East, assassinations, guerilla warfare and especially anti-guerilla warfare in the Balkans that resulted in high civilian casualties etc etc will recognize all of the above when reading this book's mentions of state and non-state actors.

Full scale psychological operations against civilian populations during Cold War (Africa, Asia, South America, Italy, contested areas near Iron curtain) using media outlets, mind-messing, changes of the regimes directly or indirectly, introducing blockades and sanctions ..... this was all as old as at least 1960's. So in general nothing new and breathtaking, except that these are writings of officers from a foreign country about use of all these measures against the America (primary opposition to China's interests). Even actions of non-state entities (cartels especially but also almost every Middle-Eastern militia) should not be a surprise since 1980's - by undermining the government they de-facto became the governments with their economy, politics, armed forces and security services.

So basically only value of the book is the way Chinese military views the US actions and doctrine starting from the First Gulf war (last old-style inter-nation war) to the time book was published. I have to say that they have a very keen eye and are very capable to link policy papers, military doctrines and non-military elements. This must be a single book where economic-hitmen are portrayed as what they are in context of military operations, very dangerous actors capable of plunging foreign markets into abyss. Although they are not directly connected with the government they are like wild dogs unleashed on any new market, acting as frauds and tricksters in order to extricate as much loot as possible - all within the law of course, because they know all the small writings. They have made huge disservice to the West at the end of Cold War and are main (or to be honest the single) reason for dislike of West in all Eastern European countries that went through so called transition period.
Since they are what you might call deniable asset they are used indirectly to strengthen the policy goals.

So, as I said very keen eye and very much aware of the IT technologies and the support role cyber warfare plays in the new world. I especially like how they are adamant that only combined use of all of the means at hand will result in victory (which is the main challenge they see - ability to adapt to ever emerging new circumstances). This view that cyber warfare plays only role of one of the arms deployed into the theater matches some of the other works I came across. On its own various arms disciplines cannot succeed. Combined they will subdue any opponent.

Also interesting point is how putting full control of means of war into hands of politicians actually produces more stress and possible vectors for conflict because they just do not know when to stop when they take the wrong turn (just look at Vietnam war, almost regular bombardment of Iraq after every affair during Clinton's presidency, not to mention occupation of Iraq during Bush (the son) in search of phantasm called WMD etc and finally way politicians handled the crisis last and this year] - they just know only to press forward because to admit they made a mistake is something only intelligent people do and lets be honest people that get elected are only nominally in this group. If you do not believe look at the episode or two of "Yes, Prime Minister" to see who actually pulls the strings and how they just keep digging deeper and deeper after first mistake they make. But I am getting off topic.

As an insight into Chinese military practice and doctrine very interesting book. It shows Chinese ability to blend experience of others with their own history.
As a breakthrough book (even at the time when it was written) ..... I dont see it as such because all of the elements presented are taken and re-arranged from the US military approach [only that Chinese at the time saw US army as able to see where it needs to go, but completely unwilling to change itself to reach the goal because they might lose funding for some of the expensive technologies - which might not be the case post 2001, when US military started to transform into highly efficient and deadly war machine)].

Only reason I gave this book 4 stars is terrible translation for this edition. Man it took me sometimes an hour to connect the dots and link finalized sentences with parts of text in the parenthesis, not to mention some weird.... weird!.....sentence structures that have no start or end. They truly need to improve editing.

Recommended as an introductory work into old/new theory of war where nothing is sacrosanct and everything is eligible target.

paulgrostad's review

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3.0

First off. The cover picture chosen in Goodreads is misleading, and the tagline is very hyperbolic.
While certainly very interesting, this book is not an easy read. The translation lacks flow, and many of the Chinese expressions don't come across very well.

joaojbrm's review against another edition

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4.0

“Guerra irrestrita”, o Mein Kampf do PCC

No atual bombardeio de informações e desinformações que nos atinge é quase impossível manter a mesma opinião por mais de três minutos. Mas uma coisa é certa. A História é uma ciência que tem muitos pontos cegos, portanto só pode ser bem analisada em retrospectiva. É temerário pintar um quadro exato da paisagem enquanto o trem está em movimento.

Há quem diga que o flagelo nacional-socialista alemão fora todo ele previsto no libelo autobiográfico de Adolf Hitler, o livro “Mein Kampf”. É verdade. Descontados os paroxismos de ódio e os delírios megalomaníacos, está tudo lá. As anexações; o Lebensraum (espaço vital); o holocausto judeu. Um ideário torpe, ainda em embrião, mas que se concretizou da forma mais macabra possível.

Falando em livros proféticos… há um escrito em 1999 por dois coronéis do Exército chinês, (Qiao Liang e Wang Xiangsui) que parece se enquadrar nessa categoria.

É sabido que a China está em guerra comercial com os EUA. Isso não prova definitivamente que haja um escalonamento desse novo tipo de violência, isto é, não se pode provar que o PCC declarou guerra ao mundo livre. Mas, se a nação mais rica do planeta está sendo atacada, é inquestionável que isso venha a afetar pelo menos grande parte do ocidente. O ato falho nesse raciocínio, e aí entra a “Guerra Irrestrita”, é achar que uma guerra hoje em dia seria conduzida nos moldes convencionais. Uma guerra comercial pode não ser noticiada pela mídia nos primeiros meses de “embate” entre os envolvidos. Estes, por sua vez, não são tão facilmente nomeáveis. Os tratados de comum acordo, as áreas de livre comércio, as uniões geopolíticas locais transformam o tabuleiro da guerra “normal” numa gigantesca estrutura feita de dominós, frágeis e prontos a cair ao menor aumento do barril de petróleo.

E quem pode afirmar que uma suposta guerra comercial não seria apenas uma frente isolada num teatro de operações muito, mas muito mais vasto e surpreendente?

Eis algumas “profecias” da “Guerra irrestrita”:

“(...) a guerra renascerá sob outro formato (...) tornando-se um instrumento de enorme poder nas mãos dos que nutrem a intenção de controlar outros países e regiões.”

“(...) enquanto presenciamos uma relativa redução na violência militar, estamos evidenciando, definitivamente, um aumento na violência política, econômica e tecnológica.”

“Desta forma, a indução de um colapso de um mercado acionário, a contaminação de uma rede de computadores por um vírus, um rumor ou escândalo que resulte na flutuação do câmbio ou, a exposição comprometedora de líderes de um país, constituem ações que podem ser enquadradas como “armas neoconcepcionais.”

“(...) tem havido o desenvolvimento de meios para atacar direta e especificamente um centro nervoso de um inimigo, sem danificar as áreas circundantes. Desta forma têm-se novas opções para obtenção da vitória, gerando a crença de que a melhor forma de se obter a vitória é através de um maior exercício de controle e não através da imposição da morte.”

“Até mesmo o último refúgio da raça humana — o mundo interior do ser humano — não está livre dos ataques da guerra psicológica.”

O que estamos vivendo neste 2020, se não uma guerra psicológica!?

E aqui um aviso temporão aos nossos comandantes militares sobre recursos materiais e humanos:

“(...) algumas nações com visão prospectiva, ao invés de única e simplesmente priorizarem os cortes de efetivos, estão enfatizando: a elevação da qualificação técnica do seu pessoal; o incremento do nível de tecnologia avançada e semi-avançada incorporada ao seu armamento; e a atualização do pensamento militar e doutrinário.”

Bem, aqui parece que o Brasil está na crista da onda, mesmo que involuntariamente, já que a evasão causada pelo achatamento dos salários iniciada nos anos noventa da década passada e levada adiante pelo atual governo, diminuiu bastante os efetivos militares.

O PCC está deixando o mundo de joelhos. Há os que se recusam a ver isso. Há as mídias literalmente compradas pelo Partido que se recusam a noticiar isso. Mascaradas e papagaiando estatísticas suspeitas, aterrorizam-nos diuturnamente com a “guerra contra o vírus”. Lembram-se da “guerra contra o terror” dos anos 2000? Aonde aquilo nos levou!? Isso, ao Iraque. Mesma tática, diferentes atores.

Sobre isso, o que diz a “Guerra irrestrita”:

“Poderia a compra ou obtenção do controle de ações ser usada para transformar os jornais e as cadeias de televisão de uma outra nação como instrumentos de uma guerra da mídia?”

E para os românticos aficcionados da guerra tradicional, homem a homem, o Ministro da Guerra francês na primeira grande guerra Georges Clemenceau, no início do século XX, declarou que “a guerra é um assunto muito sério para ser deixado a cargo dos generais”. Citado pelos coronéis chineses: “uma coisa é certa: os militares não detêm mais o monopólio da prática da guerra.”

Para os que dão um risinho superior e debocham quando alguém usa o termo “comunismo”, eis um aviso que deveria estar nos manuais das academias militares (ops, esqueci-me de que a pedagogia militar positivista é superior às ideologias!!):

“(...) Os legislativos de nações que adotam o modelo representativo de governo não podem evitar o envolvimento por parte dos grupos de “lobby”.

Enfim, o livro é um áugure moderno do que ocorre hoje, diante dos nossos olhos.

Só não ver quem não quer.

mburnamfink's review against another edition

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4.0

Strategy is not an American strength. Strategic plans are written to serve the interests of political parties and the election cycle, factions within the Pentagon and military industrial complex seeking billions of dollars for next-gen weapons system, or at best a small group of dissident colonels seeking promotion or post-retirement sinecures. Everybody has an agenda, and almost nobody is conducting honest analysis in search of the truth. The authors of Unrestricted Warfare are coming from outside the Beltway; way outside the Beltway, as they're officers in the People Liberation Army. With no DC career to worry about, there's at least the potential of some candid truth about the future of warfare, and besides as a Chinese strategic plan, reading this has the same kind of vicarious thrill as reading Guderian's Achtung-Panzer! in 1938.

The book begins promisingly enough, with chapters like "The War God's Face Has Become Indistinct" and "What Do Americans Gain By Touching the Elephant?". The introduction offers as a sensible reframing of modern warfare as I've ever seen. "We acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer 'using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's will,' but rather are 'using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests'"

The authors take as their key examples Operation Desert Storm, the 1997 Southeast Asia Financial Crisis, and the unlimited potential of cyberattacks carried out by hackers. Their analysis of Desert Storm is perhaps the most conventional section, examining in detail the successful organization of the operation under Norman Schwarzkopf, and the use of precision air power as the preeminent arm. Unfortunately, the financial crisis and the role of George Soros fails to illuminate what I can only describe as the 'Soros Conspiracy Twilight Zone.' While several Asian economies suffered massive reverses, and George Soros made a lot of money in the process, the accusation that he was responsible is not sustained (or unsustained for that matter. The issue remains open, as far as I can tell). Given the centrality of financial, economic, and media warfare to the concept of unresistricted warfare, this section deserves better. Finally, cyber attacks are treated mostly anecdotally, without a rigorous idea of the linkages between cyberspace and physical systems, or virtual attacks and real damage.

That said, there are some very clever insights into the strengths and limitations of America's high-tech Battlespace model of combat, where every soldier is networked into a regional grid that can cause any location to precisely explode at short notice (the deadliest environment on Earth, short of a nuclear firestorm) in terms of it's cost and inability to counter low-tech insurgent forces. For a pre-9/11 work, this book is horrifically prescient in linking Al Qaeda and airplanes. Conversely, key topics in strengthening local governance and legitimacy and fostering robust innovative economies not vulnerable to unrestricted warfare are mostly left out.

The original lacks the hyperbolic and inaccurate subtitle 'China's Master Plan to Destroy America' (my copy is from the nice folks at www.c4i.org). The examples are American, because America is the world's premier power, and are fairly critiqued on their strengths and weaknesses. While some parts of China's military are clearly aimed American capabilities, the ideas advanced here are seem to be more about countering and emulating American power, rather than crippling it.

As a guide to the future, Unrestricted Warfare will probably not have the impact of Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, or John Boyd. While it offers a important alternative perspective to the conventional wisdom, it's too foreign, too abstract, too hard to apply. By the standards of this book, the last 10 years of American foreign policy have been an unmitigated disaster, but I don't think the American government could ever act in such an integrated manner without a clear existential threat. I think the most trenchant critique of this book is that more than 10 years later, it's difficult to detect a coherent unrestricted warfare strategy behind China's domestic policies, provocations in the South China Sea, and African development projects. For now, unrestricted warfare is more theory than practice.